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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
Vs.
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State Engineer of the State of Utah;
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation; KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation, CENTRAL
UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT;
UTAH LAKE DISTRIBUTING COMPANY,
a corporation; UNITED STATES OF
Al-!ERICA, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR;
HUGH McKELLAR, as Provo River
Commissioner; and PROVO RESERVOIR WATER USERS COMPANY, a
corporation,

CASE NO. 14,605

Defendants & Appellants.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 76(e), U.R.C.P., defendants and appellants
petition the above entitled Court for a rehearing and respectfully
allege that the Court erred in the following particulars:
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ON THE PRIOR APPEAL
THIS COURT IN

SUBST&~CE

FOUND A MATERIAL FACT OR

FACTS TO BE IN ISSUE AND REVERSED THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Nowhere in the prior opinion of this Court does it appear
or was it ordered that the summary judgment was reversed.

Provo

City Court v. Lambert, 28 Utah 2d 194, 499 P.2d 1296 (1972).
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Likewise, on the prior appeal, both sides had filed mutual Motions
For Summary Judgment and in so doing, both sides specifically
represented to the court that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact (Defs.' Motion- R.77-80 incl., 191; Pltf.'s
Motion - R.l22-128, incl.)

This was so because the construction

or interpreta'tion of a judgment presented a question of law for
the court.

Callan v. Callan (Wash.) 468 P.2d 456 (1970).

Both sides having sought an interpretation of paragraph 4 (c)
of the Provo River Decree, laid the controversy in the lap of the
trial court by filing mutual Motions For Summary Judgment.

Mastic

Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v. Acme Distributing Co., 15 Utah 2d
136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964).

We are mindful of the rule that once

both parties move for summary judgment the court is not bound to
grant it to one side or another.

Diamond T Utah, Inc. v. Travelers

Indemnity Co., 21 Utah 2d 124, 441 P.2d 705 (1968).

However, where

the parties do not dispute each other as to the essential facts,
and each relies on them insisting on its right to prevail as a
matter of law, it is proper to determine the issue on summary
judgment.

Robinson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 22

Utah 2d 163, 450 P.2d 91 (1969); Annotation: 36 ALR 2d 881, §4(a),
pp. 901-905 inclusive.
Accordingly, this Court should have decided the matter
on tDa basis of the record then before it.

However, it then seemed

that it would be helpful to this Court in making a proper determination and interpretation of what was intended by the language
set forth in the Provo River Decree had the record contained some
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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information as to what use, if any, the plaintiff had made of
16.50 second feet of water, since its use in the operation of
the various mills had ceased.

That was the basis upon which

this Court remanded this case to the District Court.
The sum and substance of it all was that there was no
genuine issue of fact before the Court on the prior appeal, but
this Court created one by remanding the matter for a determination
of the past use of the water which neither party then asserted
had any probative value as to the interpretation of paragraph 4(c)
of the Provo River Decree.

We respectfully suggest that this

Court re-examine that aspect of this case in light of the above.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN CASTING THIS APPEAL AS A CONTEST
BETWEEN THE STATE ENGINEER'S FINDINGS

~~D

THE

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
In its opinion, this Court quoted from the testimony of
Judge Maurice Harding in the hearing before the State Engineer
and then stated:
"On the basis of such testimony, the Engineer found
that the mills ceased operating by 1941, and because
his hydrograph showed a sharp decrease of the diverted
water in the early 1940's, concluded that the decrease
was due to the cessation of the mills, and that,
therefore, the 16.5 second feet granted under paragraph 4(c) of the Decree was for power purposes, and
not for irrigation."
We respectfully submit that the foregoing is an erroneous analysis
of the record in this case.

Nowhere in the State Engineer's

report (Exhibit D) filed with the trial court, is

~

conclusion
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made as to whether paragraph 4(c) was a nonconsurnptive use power
right or an irrigation right.

His report was strictly a factual

determination of the matters referred to him.

It was only during

the evidentiary hearing before the trial court that he expressed
~

conclusions thereon.

from the

tria~

Thus, pursuant to a series of questions

court, the State Engineer concluded that if he

could not find more land irrigated than was described in paragraphs
4(a) and 4(b), which supplied 6.2 acre feet per acre without the
4(c) water, then the 4(c) water was not needed on the acreage
described in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) but was simply a power right,
nonconsumptive use power right.

(A.68, Tr. 1456).

That was the only point in the whole remand proceedings
where the State Engineer expressed any conclusions as to whether
paragraph 4(c) was a power right.

And the only basis upon which

.he expressed that conclusion was the lack of any additional irrigated acreage.
Nowhere did the State Engineer state or express any
conclusion as to whether paragraph 4(c) was a power right on
the basis of when the mills ceased operating.

The fact that he

found that the first mill appears to have ceased operation as
early as

~

and that all of the mills had ceased operation and

the use of water for power purposes by the early 1940's (Ex· D,
p.lB) was not that material to the controversy.

Yet the trial

court seized upon the error in the State Engineer's report as
being crucial to the credibility of the whole report and controlling as to its ultimate decision.

And as we read the opinion
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of this court, it too considered that really inconsequential error
as being decisive of the whole case.
The main thrust of this appeal is that the Amended
Findings are unsupported by and are contrary to the competent
evidence.

It is not a contest between the State Engineer's

findings and the findings of the trial court.

In appellant's

primary Brief we labored to point out how and why the Amended
Findings are unsupported by the evidence.

Likewise, we fully

documented the many respects in which the Amended Findings are
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

To cast

this controversy as a contest between the State Engineer's
findings and the findings of the trial court is clearly erroneous
and to settle that contest by finding that the State Engineer's
findings are based on questionable evidence whereas the findings
of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence when
there is none, is most discouraging and results in a great
injustice to the water user defendants.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS OPINION ON AN ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSION OF IRRIGATED ACREAGE.
If there was anything that came out loud and clear in
this case, it was that Provo City had never irrigated more than
2,558.6 acres from the entry of the 1921 Decree until the present
time.

None of the several witnesses referred to in this Court's

- 5 -
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opinion, who testified at the Engineer's hearing, stated that
the parcels of land that they remembered as having been irrigated
~r

in 1921 wereAincluded in the land set forth in the Decree.
The only witness who testified one way or the other
about it was J. Earl Stubbs who testified that all of the lands
he irrigated were included in the Morse (Provo River) Decree for
Provo City Irrigation.

(A.lO, R.l034, 700).

None of the other

witnesses at the State Engineer's hearing testified one way or
the other as to whether the irrigated lands were included in
the Provo River Decree.

Thus, we are at a loss to understand

where the record supports the statement in the opinion that "several
witnesses testified at the Engineer's hearing that they remembered
certain parcels of land, not included in the land set forth in
the Decree, as having been irrigated in 1921."
The only evidence relating to acreage in excess of the
2,558.6 acres was based upon irrigable acreage, ie. lands
susceptible to irrigation, as distinguished from irrigated acreage,
ie. lands in fact irrigated.

The net effect of it all is that

the trial court awarded Provo City a right to divert and use
additional water from the Provo River to irrigate some nebulous
acreage without fixing the number of acres or where located or
the beneficial use requirements thereof, all of which has to be
a most erroneous result and contrary to the fundamental principles
of our water law.

Irrigable acreage never has been the basis of

establishing a water right in this state.

Yet that is the effect

of the opinion of this Court and we respectfully submit must be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reversed on a rehearing of this matter.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO HOLD THAT THE
ACREAGE LIMITATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 4(a) AND 4(b) OF
THE PROVO RIVER DECREE ARE RES JUDICATA
Respondent Provo City and Appellant Provo Reservoir Water
users Company, as successor in interes·t to Provo Reservoir Company, are both parties to the Provo River Decree (Civil No. 2888).
The irrigation rights of Provo City were determined and fixed by
the Provo River Decree on the basis of a total of 2,558.51 acres
under paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) as the maximum irrigated acreage
to which it was entitled.

The Provo River Decree is res judicata

and binding on Provo City, both as to the issues that were tried
and those that were triable.

Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 453,

76 P.2d 946 (1962), Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 45 P.2d
1044 (1971), National Finance Co. of Provo v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d
263, 382 P.2d 405 (1963), Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., (Utah), 521
P.2d 379 (1974).
If Provo City had additional irrigated acreage, it was
encumbent on it to assert its claim thereto in Civil 2888, and
obtain an award for such additional acreage.

Having failed to

do so, it was and is barred from subsequently asserting such claim
under the principles of res judicata.

The foregoing issue was

squarely raised in appellant's primary Brief under Point II thereof.
Nowhere in the Court's opinion is the foregoing issue resolved
or discussed unless it comes within the category of other arguments
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presented by defendants which the court believes are without
merit.
We respectfully submit that the issue of res judicata is
not only crucial to this appeal but is crucial to every irrigation right from the Provo River.

The very foundation of the

irrigation rights under the Provo River Decree was the irrigated
acreages and the duty of water in acres per second foot.

If the

irrigated acreages as decreed therein are not res judicata, the
Provo River Decree has been emasculated.

We respectfully urge

that this Court re-examine this issue and come to some decision
as to whether the principles of res judicata apply to the total
of 2,558.51 acres of land awarded to Provo City under paragraphs
4(a) and 4(b) of the Provo River Decree.

We respectfully submit

that it does, and this Court should accordingly so hold.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS OPINION THAT DEFENDANTS AS
JUNIOR APPROPRIATORS WILL NOT BE DEPRIVED OF WATER
TO WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED.
In its opinion, the Court concludes that there is no
evidence in the record that defendants, or anyone else, have
filed for the appropriation of the waters in question.

As such,

the Court not only misconstrues the law, but misinterprets the
record in this case.
The substance of it all is that one does not file on
a specific corpus of water.

Rather, one files an application to

appropriate the unappropriated waters of the stream.

This the
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defendants did and evidence of their respective water rights
was received and are in the record.

(Exhibit I, r.l465, 1479;

Ex. K, r.l481, 1482; Ex. 0, r.l487, 1491, 1492; Ex. S, J, L,
r.l480, 1481; Ex. N, r.l486, 1487).

Furthermore

Provo City

conceded that if it does not get the 16.5 second feet of water
under paragraph 4(c) of the Provo River Decree, it will go into
the Provo River (A.70, R.l511) and the trial court acknowledged
that defendants' water rights will be affected by its decision
in this case.

(A.70, R.l511, 1512).

It is elementary to our water law that water rights are
administered on a priority system and any reversion of water rights
to the public would go first to satisfy the rights of junior
appropriators.

Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land

and Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 Pac. 2d 634 (1943).

If the

waters in question remain in the Provo River, such waters will be
distributed to the defendants water users to fill their junior
rights in accordance with their respective priorities.

If such

waters are delivered to Provo City, the defendant water users will
be deprived of the use thereof in inverse order of their respective priorities.

To suggest as does the opinion of this Court

that defendants were required to file on that water is clearly
erroneous.
The hydrographs [Exs. 14, 15(a), (b) and (c)] factually
demonstrate the quantities of water which have been delivered
to Provo City over the years.

It is undisputed that the block of

water between the red line and the blue line on those exhibits was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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never called for, received or used by Provo City.

Likewise, it

cannot be disputed that such block of water will be taken away
from the junior appropriators, notably the defendant water user
Those are the disastrous consequences of the Amended Judgment.
We respectfully urge that this Court grant a rehearing and
remedy those disastrous consequences.
submitted,

Jensen
sistant Atto ey General
Attorney for efendants and
Appellants, State Engineer
and River Commissioner
442 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

sep Novak,
ttorney for Defendants and
Appellants Provo River Water
Users Association, Utah Lake
Distributing Company and
Provo Reservoir Water Users
Company, and for and in behal
of all remaining Appellants
except State Engineer
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

27~ day of February,

1978, I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing Petition For
Rehearing to
Jackson Howard
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

Ramon M. Child,
United States Attorney
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant United States of .
America, Bureau of ReclamatlO
200 u. S. Post Office and
Courthouse Building
. Salt Lake

:32

Utah 84101
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